We investigate the modal logic of interpretability over Peano arithmetic (PA). Our main result is an extension of the arithmetical completeness theorem for the interpretability logic ILM ! . This extension concerns recursively enumerable sets of formulas of interpretability logic (rather than single formulas). As corollaries we obtain a uniform arithmetical completeness theorem for the interpretability logic ILM and a theorem answering a question of Orey from 1961. All these results also hold for Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF).
Introduction Provability logic
Provability logic is concerned with the investigation of various metamathematical relations with the aid of modal logic. For instance, provability logic has been used to investigate di erent notions of provability, i n terpretability, c o n s e rvativity, and tolerance.
The fundamental connection between modal logic and metamathematics is provided by certain functions called realizations. These are primitive recursive functions that translate modal formulas into arithmetical sentences, in a way that preserves logical form and maps modalities on formalizations of metamathematical relations.
The so-called arithmetical completeness theorems (ACTs) have played an extremely important r o l e i n p r o vability logic ever since the rst ones were showed by S o l o vay in 1976 Sol76] . These theorems connect some notion of realization with a system of modal logic L and may be phrased as follows: \Let A be a modal formula. Then every realization translates A into a true (provable) arithmetical sentence i A is provable in L." Thus, ACTs tell us exactly what metamathematical principles of a certain linguistic class are true (provable). Furthermore, in cases where the modal logic L is decidable, the ACTs imply decidability theorems for the corresponding fragments of metamathematics.
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When it comes to certain in nitary aspects of metamathematics, however, standard ACTs are of little help. To get at those aspects, the perspective m ust be shifted from single modal formulas to in nite sets of modal formulas. Then one may ask, for instance, what in nite sets of modal formulas are realizable in the sense that there is a realization mapping all the formulas of the set on true (provable) arithmetical sentences.
So far, only a few scattered results seem to exist in this eld of (in nitary) provability logic. Among those are the uniform ACTs (see Smo85] ) and some theorems of Shavrukov on Magari algebras Sha93] . This author's Ph. D. thesis Str96] w as also devoted to the subject.
A survey of provability logic can be found in JdJ98].
Interpretability logic
As a preliminary, let us start by outlining the de nition of interpretability. Roughly, the theory S interprets the theory T if there is a natural way of translating the language of S into the language of T in such a w ay that the translations of all the axioms of T become provable in S. We w r i t e S T if this is the case. For a precise de nition, see e.g. Vis97] .
A derived notion is that of (relative) interpretability over a base theory T. Let and be arithmetical sentences. We say that interprets over T if T + T + . Interpretability logic is the branch of provability logic that studies interpretability. The subject was introduced by Visser Vis90] , who also showed two ACTs for the relation of interpretability o ver nitely axiomatized theories. In the same vein, Berarducci Ber90] a n d S h a vrukov Sha88] independently showed two A CTs for the relation of interpretability o ver theories like PA and ZF.
An overview of interpretability logic, including ample motivation for studying the subject, can be found in Vis97]. In the present paper, we obtain extensions of the above-mentioned ACTs by Berarducci and Shavrukov. Our extensions concern r. e. sets of modal formulas (rather than single formulas). The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we state our main theorem and in section 3 we p r o ve i t . Section 4 contains four easy corollaries to the main theorem.
Main theorem
We begin this section by i n troducing the terminology needed to state the main theorem.
The formulas of interpretability logic are constructed from propositional variables using the binary modality , the unary modality 2, the connective !, and the propositional constant ?. The symbols :, _,^, and $ are introduced as abbreviations in the usual way. We write > for :? and 3 for :2:.
We use the letter p for propositional variables and A, B, C, D for formulas of interpretability logic. The letters E, F, G are reserved for sets of formulas of interpretability l o g i c .
The set S(A) o f subformulas of A is de ned as expected. Let S(E) b e t h e set of subformulas of formulas of E.
The rules of the interpretability logic ILM are modus ponens and necessitation (from A infer 2A), and its axioms are as follows:
All propositional tautologies,
The logic ILM ! has the same set of formulas as ILM. Its axioms are the theorems of ILM together with the formulas 2A ! A. Its only rule is modus ponens.
E is well-speci ed i A 2 S(E) ) A 2 E or :A 2 E , for every A whose main symbolis or 2.
The formulas of arithmetic are built up as usual from the non-logical symbols 0, succ, +, . We use the letters and for arithmetical sentences. Let and 2 be natural formalizations of the assertions \PA + interprets PA + ", and \PA proves ", respectively. Note that we use the symbols2 and both in modal and arithmetical contexts. This ambiguity should be unproblematic because of our other notational conventions.
A realization is a recursive function i from modal formulas to arithmetical We use the letters a, b, c, d for nodes in general and r for roots. The letter k is reserved for models.
The forcing relation is extended to cover arbitrary formulas of interpretability logic using the following key clause: Now let us x a natural way of encoding nodes and models. We assume that 0 is not the code of any n o d e o f a n y model. We also assume that the code of each node belonging to a model k permits us to recover the model k in a primitive recursive fashion. The following characterization of interpretability o ver PA will be used several times.
Lemma 3.2 (Orey-H ajek) PA proves: 8 $ 8 s2( ! 3 s ( ))].
Proof. See page 1065 in Ber90].
We also need the following re ection-principle:
Proof. See page 1064 in Ber90].
Next we i n troduce the theory ACA 0 . This step is not strictly necessary for our present purposes, but working in ACA 0 instead of PA will make s o m e o f o u r proofs easier.
ACA In addition to the lemmas mentioned here, we w i l l m a k e (implicit) use of provable 1 -completeness, the recursion theorem, and the de nability of primitive recursive functions in arithmetic. Now we leave the modal and arithmetical preliminaries behind and embark on the proof of the main theorem. This proof was profoundly inspired by t wo proofs by Z a m bella: the proof First we set out to arithmetize the set F. This we do with some care, since we w ant certain properties of the arithmetization to be provable in PA. To that end we begin by i n troducing an auxiliary modal concept. Claim 3.6 PA proves: if G is nite and well-speci ed, then G is disjunctive.
Proof. We want to prove a connection between a local syntactical property (well-speci ed) and a global property that involves quanti cation over in nitely many formulas (disjunctive).
Argue in PA: \Suppose G is nite and well-speci ed, but not disjunctive.
Then we m a y assume that G W fA i B i : i ng and G 6 A i B i , f o r e v ery i n. By Lemma 3.1(iii) there are models k i witnessing that G 6 A i B i , for every i n. First note that Q is primitive recursive b y Lemma 3.1(v).
(i) Clearly, Q(n) = Q 0 (n) f o r e v ery n. Hence E = Q(n) and so (i) follows.
(ii) An easy induction in PA shows that every Q(n) i s w ell-speci ed. Hence by Claim 3.6, every Q(n) is disjunctive.
(iii) This can also be shown by an easy induction in PA.
In view of Claim 3.7(i) we m a y henceforth consider A 2 F to be an abbreviation of 9n(Q(n)`A). Thus, by Lemma 3.1(v), A 2 F i s a 1 sentence.
Our next goal is to to de ne a formula Z encoding a maximal consistent superset of F. This concludes the modal part of the construction. Next we will proceed with the arithmetical part and de ne a Solovay function f using the recursion theorem.
To that end we r s t i n troduce some abbreviations that refer to the g odelnumber of f, and then we de ne f itself.
Let 0 := 8n(f(n) = 0), a := \the limit of f is the node a". Recall that no nodes are encoded by 0 . Thus a 6 = 0 holds automatically. Let A := \the limit of f is a node that forces A (in its uniquely determined model)" and a b (n) : = 8m n(f(m) = a _ f(m) = b). Let rank(a n) b e t h e s m a l l e s t n umber s such t h a t I s proves : a with a proof of length n, if such a proof exists. Otherwise rank(a n) is unde ned. 1. f(n) = 0 , n is a proof in PA of A ! 3 1 ( B ) and some minimal model k with root r witnesses that Q(n) 6 A B. Then in k some node a 6 = r forces A and lacks S r -connections to nodes that force B. f(n + 1) := the smallest such a.
2. f(n) 6 = 0 .
1. For some a and m n, (i) n is a proof in PA of : f(n) a (m),
(ii) f(m) = : : : = f(n), (iii) f(n)Ra. f(n + 1 ) : = a. 2. Case 2.1 does not apply and there is a node a and some i < n such that (i) rank(a n) i < rank(f(n) n ),
f(n + 1) := the smallest such a. 3. Cases 2.1 and 2.2 do not apply and there is a node a and some i < n such t h a t (i) rank(a n) i < rank(f(n) n ), (ii) f(i) = 0 , (iii) f(n)S r a, where r is the root of the unique model associated with f(n). f(n + 1) := the smallest such a. 3. Otherwise. f(n + 1 ) : = f(n).
Remark 3.9 Here are a few remarks about the de nition of f:
1. By the recursion theorem, f is partially recursive. So, by i n s p e c t i n g t h e de nition of f, w e m a y conclude that f is primitive recursive. 2. We will soon see that f does not move in the standard model. The reason is that f can only make nitely many m o ves and every move presupposes that (provably in PA) more moves are to come.
3. Note that if f(n + 1 ) = f(n), then Case 3 applies at n+1. Also note that whenever Case 2.2 or 2.3 applies, all ranks involved are de ned.
Now w e are ready to bring the modal and arithmetical parts together.
Let i(A) : = ( 0^Z (A)) _ A . Remark 3.10 Before proving that i satis es the premises of Claim 3.5, let us give some motivation for this de nition of i.
Given that 0 is true, (Z3) ensures that i(A) is true, for every A 2 F . We also want i to commute with the symbols , !, a n d ? up to provable equivalence in PA. When 0 is false, we proceed roughly as in Zam92]. When 0 is true, we proceed as follows:
{ The Boolean connectives commute, since Z, regarded as a set, is maximal consistent b y (Z1) and (Z2).
{ Suppose i(A B). Then Z(A B). To get a contradiction we assume :(i(A) i(B)). Then, to get a concrete situation to work with, we apply Lemma 3.2 (losing no generality). Following this
strategy we h a ve t o work inside a 2-environment and furthermore, some useful consequence of the non-1 sentence Z(A B) should be transferable into that 2-environment. Here we see the bene t of (Z4) (and ultimately the assumption that E is well-speci ed), which permits us to conclude that A B 2 F . 
{ Suppose i(A) i(B). Then we want to have i(A B), which is equivalent t o Z(A B), and by ( Z 4 ) , t o A B 2 F . So we h a ve t o avoid the situation i(A) i(B)^(A B = 2 F ). This we d o b y ensuring
that f moves whenever such a situation arises. But guaranteeing this in the most straight-forward way w ould make f non-recursive.
This would in turn prevent u s from transfering values of f into 2-environments. Therefore we let f move in Case 2.1 already when a decidable tendency in this direction arises. Lemma 3.2 is used to formulate this tendency. Note that the situation that mu s t b e a voided is described by a 2 sentence (again by Lemma 3.2), consisting of one arithmetical part and one modal part, none of which i s 1 . This feature distinguishes the present construction from its raw-models.
Claim 3.11 PA proves: f has a limit.
Proof. Argue in PA: \If f moves at all, then it moves into or inside some nite model k. Clearly, if h is the R-height of k, then f cannot take more than h consecutive R-steps (steps according to 2.1). But by an easy argument that involves M, f cannot take more than h R-steps in total. Also, every time f takes an S a -step (a step according to 2.2), or an S r -step (a step according to 2.3), it moves to nodes of strictly lower rank at the relevant stages. Moreover, the rank of a xed node never increases at later stages. Hence f eventually reaches a limit." We then have the following possibilities:
Case 1 applies at n + 1 . Then there is a minimal node a and formulas A and B as in Case 1 of the de nition of f. Note that f(m) = a. We will show that 2(: a ), which is more than we n e e d . We already know that 2( a ! 3 1 ( B )) holds. Therefore it su ces to show t h a t 2(2 1 (: B )).
Argue in PA:
\Let us show t h a t 2 1 (: B ). Argue in I 1 : \We will show t h a t : B . Note that f(n + 1 ) = a and also that (in k) a lacks S r -connections to nodes that force B. Thus it is enough to show t h a t n 0 + 1 n + 1 implies aS r f(n Proof. This follows from Claims 3.11 and 3.12.
Claim 3.14 A 2 F ) i(A) is true. Proof. Suppose A 2 F . Then Z(A) is true, by (Z3) and the truth of the theory PA. But by Claim 3.13, 0 is also true. Consequently i(A) is true.
Let X be a model of PA. Since f is a function in X, the sequence f(0) f (1) : : : is de ned in X. By Claim 3.11 it converges. Whenever f moves from one node to another it moves by a n R-step, an S a -step or an S r -step. The orbit generated by f in X is the above sequence, but with commas and consecutive repetitions omitted and with symbols for the relations that are responsible for the transitions inserted. For example, 0aRbS r cS a b could be an orbit.
The following is a strengthening of Claim 3.12, the proof of which invokes Claim 3.12. In particular, by Claim 3.15, PA proves: for every a, i f f visits a, t h e n 2(: a ).
Hence PA proves that the rank of any node that f visits eventually becomes de ned. we have rank(b n) s when n is large enough. Hence we can x n so that the following holds in X: rank(a n) is de ned, rank(b n) s and f never leaves a after stage n. In particular, Cases 2.1 and 2.2 never apply in X after stage n. Note that rank(a n) is non-standard in X by Lemma 3.3. Thus all in all (again taking advantage of our view on X from the outside) we can conclude that the conditions f(s) = 0 and rank(b n) s < rank(a n) hold in X. Since hold in X. Hence, in X, rank(c n) i s s when n is large enough. Now x n m so that rank(c n) s holds in X. By Lemma 3.3 rank(b n) is non-standard in X. However s is standard in X. Thus in X we h a ve rank(c n) s < r a n k (b n).
Since we also have bS a c, it follows that, in X, Case 2.2 applies at n + 1 and f(n + 1 ) = c. Consequently f(n + 1 ) 6 = b holds in X. Corollary 4.3 There is a realization i such that for every A, A i PA`i(A). Proof. Let E be the union of the sets fA B :`A Bg, f2A :`2Ag, f:(A B) : 6 A Bg, a n d f:2A : 6 2Ag. Then E is r. e. and well-speci ed. It is also easy to check that it is consistent w i t h ILM ! . So by the main theorem, some realization i witnesses that E is realizable. Using Lemma 3.1(iv), note that A ) 2A ) 2A 2 E ) PA`i(A) a n d 6 A ) 6 2A ) : 2A 2 E ) PA 6 i(A).
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For the last corollary, w e need a de nition:
Let an Orey set b e a s e t E such t h a t f o r a l l A, i f A 2 E , then A is either of the form B C or of the form :(B C), for some formulas of propositional logic B and C. V G-re exive models of a particularly simple kind. Those models consist of a root r and one single layer of nodes above r . Moreover, the nodes above r may be partitioned into groups inside of which the relation S r is total, and outside of which S r is empty.
Remark 4.6 It is straight-forward to verify that all the above results also hold with ZF in the place of PA (and the G odel-Bernay set theory GB in the place of ACA 0 ).
